

# **DO WE NEED RECONCILIATION AFTER CONFLICT?**

THE EXAMPLES OF SOUTH AFRICA  
AND BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

*“We are sleepwalking into another Balkan crisis”*

This warning in an article in *The Guardian* 22 October 2008 by Paddy Ashdown, former High Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina, BiH, and Richard Holbrooke, chief US negotiator in the 1995 Peace Accord for BiH, seemed to draw “worst case” conclusions from developments in BiH during the last few years. I had just decided to attempt this comparison between two post-conflict countries, BiH and South Africa, from the point of view of reconciliation or the absence thereof and consequences for the risk of a repeat of the conflict.

Subsequent reading and interviews with representatives of the different population groups, academics, diplomats and politicians confirm that developments in BiH have not been satisfactory from a reconciliation perspective. Opinions differ as to the risk for violence.

When I served as Swedish Ambassador in BiH 2001-2005, I met with a high ranking lawyer who worked for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ICTY. His motivation, he said, was that he had experienced in his home country (Australia) that his Yugoslav neighbors in the early nineties had said that they would send their sons to fight for their population group if a war started again. The scaring thing was not that they said it, but that the sons actually went, he said. Most of my interlocutors today agree that a process exposing the truth of what actually happened in the last war is essential, not the least so that the youth of today and tomorrow do not grow up with different stories about it, which is what is happening today.

The idea behind a comparison with South Africa is not just the obvious, to show that a reconciliation process can help prevent a repeat of conflict along the lines of the last one, but also to hold out the worst case scenario for a South Africa in the 1990s *without* a truth and reconciliation process. As deputy head of mission in South Africa (1987-92) and later as Ambassador (2005-08), I am well aware of what has happened and can imagine what *could* have happened, had South Africa not embarked on its reconciliatory political course.

Similarly, an attempt will be made in this paper to hold out a best case scenario of a reconciled BiH and contrast this with the worry expressed by Ashdown and Holbrooke. I do not think that it is too late for reconciliation. But I also don't believe that it can wait. My interviews and reading reveal that political reform and progress is repeatedly blocked along the battle lines of the conflict of the last decade. While few fear an immediate outbreak of renewed violence, stagnation is, as one opposition politician told me, perhaps the best case scenario, unless leaders in BiH decide to support a process of at least establishing a common truth about the last conflict.

## 2. ABOUT RECONCILIATION TODAY

Reconciliation has been described as the effort *“to build a shared future from a divided past”* (quoted from Archbishop Tutu in *“Reconciliation After Violent Conflict – A Handbook”*, International IDEA 2003). The authors of the handbook describe reconciliation not as *“a luxury, or an add-on to democracy. Reconciliation is an absolute necessity.”*

A recent academic definition can be found in Karen Brounéus PhD dissertation (Rethinking Reconciliation, Uppsala Universitet 2008): *“Reconciliation is a societal process involving mutual acknowledgment of past suffering and the changing of destructive attitudes and behavior into constructive relationships toward sustainable peace.”* Thus: *“Reconciliation means finding a way to balance truth and justice so that a gradual change of behaviors, attitudes and emotions can take place between former enemies”*(*ibid*).

In the following, development in two post conflict countries, South Africa and Bosnia Herzegovina, respectively, will be shortly described from the perspective of reconciliation. The author has worked as a diplomat, a total of eight years in South Africa and four years in Bosnia Herzegovina and will use own experiences and interviews for this analysis.

The author will try to evaluate the importance of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission by speculating in what could have happened if there had been no policy of reconciliation and no Commission. This chapter will start with a description of the situation in South Africa in the early 1990s , politically and economically. It will be argued that the actual development represents something of a “best case” scenario, given the starting point.

In a following chapter, a description will be made of the situation in Bosnia Herzegovina in the early years of this millennium. A local attempt to establish, with Swedish support, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in BiH will be described. Then, as with South Africa, an attempt will be made to do a “what if” analysis. What if BiH had embraced the idea of a truth and reconciliation process, instead of having only a war crime tribunal?

Finally, an attempt will be made to draw conclusions from the two cases. The fact that the risk of a repeat of armed conflict along the dividing lines of the last conflict is generally considered to be higher in BiH than in South Africa will be measured against the absence or presence, respectively, of a truth and reconciliation policy.

### 3. SETTING THE SCENE

#### SOUTH AFRICA

*“Our task is to reconcile the aspirations of the majority with the fears of the minority”*

This was Nelson Mandela’s message to his people before he was released from prison. He was released into one of the most polarized societies of the world. South Africa was politically, socially and economically in a stalemate. The white, racist regime had realized that apartheid could not work or be upheld. This was the result of a combination of factors. One was the resistance led by Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress, the ANC. International pressure was also increasing and the combination had an adverse effect on an otherwise strong economy.

The de Klerk led government’s decision to release Mandela and unban the ANC and its ally, the South African Communist Party, SACP, came as a total surprise to all but very few who had been party to the exploratory contacts between the regime and the ANC, initiated under de Klerk’s predecessor, P.W. Botha. After the unbanning of the ANC and release of Mandela, negotiations started on a new constitution. During the talks, political killings continued, and the government continued to support the Inkhata Freedom Party, IFP, which waged an armed campaign against ANC supporters in its home province, Kwazulu Natal, but also increasingly in and around Johannesburg. Mysterious death squads opened fire on commuters, spreading terror in the townships while negotiations were going on.

Groups to the right of de Klerk’s Nationalist Party made a failed attempt to start a military coup with the help of the army of one of the so called homelands, only to find that the mainly black soldiers turned on the coup plotters.

It appeared at the time that the minority government did not have in mind to agree to a constitution that was to give equal rights, one man one vote, to the entire population, but was rather trying to hold on to power, while giving only as little influence as possible to the majority. They had tried before to release Mandela on condition that he renounce violence, but he answered saying that only free men could negotiate. When the popular ANC leader Chris Hani was murdered during the talks, it is said that the ANC was close to calling off the negotiations.

There were in other words deep divisions and suspicions on all sides as the country approached its first democratic elections. An anecdote might help to illustrate the gap between the population groups. I remember coming to South Africa for the first time in the mid-eighties, when resistance to apartheid was increasing and oppression was at its height. The woman cutting my hair asked me where I came from and what I thought of South Africa. When I hinted that change was needed, she told me what her grandmother had said when she saw the first black newsreader on television: “What are *they* doing on *our* television?!” I came back from that first visit thinking what a perfect fools’ paradise South Africa had been made for the white population. Segregation meant that a white person never had to see a township where black people with jobs could live, let alone one of the so called homelands to which they were otherwise banished.

Two examples: While I was there plans were made to construct a bypass motorway in one little town, I believe it was Grahamstown, so that (white) motorists would not have to pass by an area where black people lived. Attempts were made to move the whole population of Alexandra in Johannesburg, the first township reserved for blacks there, because the neighboring communities, all for whites, had grown around it. Resistance from the population that time made removal impossible, maybe because it could not easily be hidden from the view of media. Alexandra was thus saved from following the examples of Sophiatown and District Six, which had both been evacuated and erased for being populated by blacks in “the wrong place”.

So the prospects for interracial harmony or even co-existence under a new democratic dispensation were not bright when agreement had finally been reached. How were Mandela and his ANC to achieve his vision of reconciling the aspirations of the majority with the fears of the minority? One incident is often said to have meant more to persuade the minority white population to accept the change than many others. That was when Mandela arrived at the first international rugby championship where South Africa was again allowed to participate, wearing the shirt of the team and declaring that the team was now “his” and that they were playing for the whole nation. They went on to win the championship. Rugby had been almost exclusively played by and watched by whites and some of Mandela’s supporters had suggested that this must change immediately, including the name of the team, The Springboks. (White South Africans liked to tell me at the time that rugby is not a matter of life and death to them, it is more important than that!)

Reconciliation was discussed as part of the negotiations for a new constitution and its implementation. Some, including certain ANC leaders, thought it best to have a short process. Leaders could have a meeting and confess killings and other possible crimes committed in the course of the conflict and then apologize to each other – the argument being that it would be better to have it over with as quickly as possible and move on. Others felt that the nation needed proper healing, which included divulging as much as possible and with a possibility of offering amnesty and reparations. As is now well known, the latter argument prevailed and South Africa went through a protracted truth and reconciliation process.

One purpose of this paper is to reflect on what that process has meant for stability and growth in South Africa. As the author has served as a diplomat in South Africa and also in another post conflict country, Bosnia Herzegovina, a comparison will be made. What would have happened had South Africa *not* embarked on its policy of reconciliation, and what would have been different, had Bosnia Herzegovina accepted a similar process?

## BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA

*“You will find that a lot is going on, but very little is happening”.*

This was a remark from a diplomat colleague at my arrival in Sarajevo in 2001. The Dayton Peace Accord had been signed six years earlier. The scars of war were still very much in evidence. I could see when flying in that most houses near the airport, where a frontline had gone, were still without roofs. Talking to people, it was evident that the psychological scars were no more repaired than the physical ones. One of the three presidents of the country (there is one representing each of the three major population groups) the Serb one, received diplomats in a technical college on the other side of the mountains surrounding Sarajevo, technically in Republika Srpska, the Serb dominated part of the country, and behind the former frontlines, from which Serb forces had besieged the city. He did obviously not feel safe or welcome in the presidential palace in the city.

BiH was run as much by the international community as by its own politicians, if not more. I remember going to a meeting at the office of the High Representative, charged with implementing the Peace Accord, to discuss the possible firing of one of the three presidents. The international community had given itself such powers, called the Bonn Powers after the place where the decision was taken, after failing to persuade the local politicians e.g. on the necessity to fight corruption at all levels. Why had it gone to such extremes?

Bosnians are fond of political jokes. One goes as follows: A Bosnian is given three wishes by a fairy. He asks for a cow, and promptly gets one. When asked for his second wish, he asks that the neighbor's cow must die. This also happens. And the third wish? I must then ask for my cow to die, says the Bosnian. That also happens, but before leaving, the fairy asks about the rationale for this last wish. Well, I wouldn't want my neighbor to come begging for milk, would I!

I was often reminded of this story during my four years in BiH. To cut off one's nose to spite one's face is not a BiH invention. To understand this kind of seemingly incomprehensible behavior, one must of course look for the historic background. I learnt that most of the population now inhabiting this part of the Balkans came from the direction of present day Ukraine more than one thousand years ago. They largely look the same and speak the same language, although even this is contested now. The split came largely because of later affiliation to different outside forces. A portion was or became orthodox by belief, the Serbs, another Catholic, the Croats. When the Ottoman Empire conquered the area, they did not actively propagate for their religion, islam, to be adopted, nor did they bring in many settlers. But to make a civil or military career it was necessary to convert. Conversion also meant exemption from taxes. So today's Slavic speaking European muslims in BiH are descendants of families who converted. To many, conversion appeared not to have meant much, and there are many stories of how Bosnians of all faiths used to celebrate each other's religious holidays, which is said to have affected productivity. (The Nobel Prize winner Ivo Andric has given many examples of the cultural behavior in a country where the population was split by allegiances they happened to form with occupying powers. )During the Yugoslav years, intermarriages became more and more common, especially in Sarajevo.

Not to make this a (bad) history paper, suffice it to say that at times in BiH history, the religious affiliation has become or been made to be a problem, if not *the* problem. Never

more so than during the last two wars, the Second World War and the war after the break-up of Yugoslavia.

Truth and reconciliation was never part of the peace deal in BiH. When I arrived in 2001 an attempt had been made with Swedish support to start a process by bringing the religious leaders together. A draft bill had been written by a local group, led by the leader of the small Jewish community in Sarajevo. No politician or political party had, however, been prepared to table the bill in Parliament. I took it upon myself, given my background in South Africa and the interest in Stockholm in these matters, to ask politicians and others about the apparent lack of interest in the issue.

Not surprisingly, answers varied according to affiliation. Generally, Muslims would tell me that their population group, being the main victims of the last conflict, was primarily interested in justice. They largely knew who the perpetrators were and the issue was to get these to answer in court for their crimes. The other two groups may have suspected that a truth commission would confirm the view of the Muslims, who they saw as having the sympathy of the international community. In other words, either they did not want to be exposed as the main culprits or thought that they would not get a fair hearing.

So the question might be asked if it is important for BiH to have a truth and reconciliation process. Scholars and politicians/diplomats have for some time propagated the view that it is important to have such a process in a post conflict situation, mainly in order to lower the risk of a repeat of violent conflict. It has been pointed out that injustices are never forgotten, neither by victims nor by perpetrators. Better than that they are exposed and dealt with. The interviews made in BiH by Roland Kostic and used in his doctoral dissertation ("Ambivalent Peace", cf. bibliography) give a few examples of feelings and views held by political leaders and also by ordinary people after the conflict. Some are clearly prepared to support restarting the conflict along the lines left after the last war if they feel that their interests are threatened. And all three major groups see themselves as victims of the last conflict. BiH politicians have repeatedly shown that they are prepared to obstruct the process towards EU membership rather than agree to reforms which they see as infringements on the conditions offered their population group in Dayton. And the electorate has continued to vote along "ethnic" lines.

A series of interviews made by the author in March of 2009, mainly in Sarajevo, seem to confirm the findings of Kostic from 2005. Diplomats and political and other leaders talk about a continued stalemate in the reform process necessary i. a. for EU integration. A few reforms have been decided, but only after outside pressure, and many are rolled back or ignored in practice. Reforms aimed at state building on the national level are blocked. Parallel structures are being created. It is often "two steps forward and three backwards", says one diplomat from a leading country. (A collection of quotes from the interviews is attached, as is a list of interviewees.)

Republika Srpska leaders are threatening with secession, which is believed by some observers as a genuine "early warning", by others as mere positioning. Many Croats are said to be leaving, fearing to become a genuine minority in a possible new dispensation. Bosniaks fear being left behind by the EU, as in a ghetto as someone says, when visa liberalization will be given to Serbs in Serbia and thereby to Serbs in BiH who can acquire Serbian passports just as Croats in BiH can get – and often have – Croatian citizenship. The absence of genuine reform prevents economic development from taking off. Very few refugees return from abroad.

Sports rarely unites, many examples of the opposite are given. Integration of schools and curricula is also a failure, in many places the best result is "two schools under one roof", where children of different background attend in shifts. The youth is described as more

radical than their parents. All three population groups continue to describe themselves as the main victims of the last war.

The only exceptions seem to be business, where free mobility now helps businesses to operate in the whole country (the war is then not talked about, as someone observes). The different population groups are said to agree on the need for some continued foreign military presence, as a protection from the other groups. Writers and poets from the region have reestablished contacts through a Swedish supported initiative to publish short stories and poems in a joint periodical, "Sarajevo Notebooks". Sida personnel describe how mayors from municipalities representing different population groups choose to cooperate in a Swedish supported program for municipal development. Other such examples are talked about.

A special phenomenon resulting from dividing the population mainly according to religious affiliation is that you get a group of people who don't belong in any of the groups. In the very special legal speak of BiH these are called "others". A young girl working for the Embassy in Sarajevo explained that her father was Serb, her mother Catholic and her boyfriend Muslim. What does this make me and our children when we get them, she asked? Other groups are more easily defined such as practicing Jews or Roma. What unites them in the present dispensation is that they are "others" and that they all feel negatively discriminated against.

It is often pointed out that in one area, the population groups are able to cooperate, seemingly without problems, and that is in criminal activity. Smuggling and other rackets aimed at siphoning off resources from the state are said to be shared by the groups, and at times by their politicians. If so, this could explain the interest in status quo, as EU membership would make these operations more difficult, if not impossible.

Richard Holbrooke, the American chief negotiator in the process leading to the Dayton Peace Accord, and Paddy Ashdown, High Representative in Sarajevo during my time in the country, have recently written an article saying that in their opinion BiH is a powder keg and that the risk for a renewed conflict is real (*The Guardian* 22 October 2008). Morton Abramovitz and Daniel Serwer (GlobalSecurity.org, 9 March 2009) suggest that there is need for a new Dayton Conference in order to break the present constitutional deadlock.

#### **4. SOUTH AFRICA WITHOUT A TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION PROCESS: AN ATTEMPT AT CONTRA FACTUAL HISTORY**

In this chapter, an attempt will be made to write a contra factual history (a “what if” scenario) for South Africa post apartheid. The assumption will be made that South Africa had *not* adopted the policy of truth and reconciliation. As this policy and the process that ensued were based on the attitude and decisions of such leaders as Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Tutu, a broader definition will have to be made to make the assumption more realistic: What would have happened in South Africa, had Nelson Mandela and others *not* propagated reconciliation as the basis for a developmental policy which included his and his party’s former foes?

From the short back ground given above, it is clear that the transformation from apartheid to democracy in South Africa was not exactly smooth sailing. The main protagonists had different goals and were prepared to resort to violence, or in the case of the ANC, to go back to violence. If we assume that Nelson Mandela had come out of prison a bitter man and had not adopted the view that it was important to reconcile, in his words, the fears of the minority with the aspirations of the majority, it becomes reasonable also to assume that he would have been less willing for example to continue the negotiations leading to a government of national unity after such incidents as the killing of Chris Hani, a central figure for the ANC.

Mandela and others would then probably also not have supported the so called sunset clause, suggested by the communist leader Joe Slovo, offering (white) civil servants job security. Without giving further examples, let me just state that it is easy to construct a scenario where the parties had not been able to agree. For argument’s sake, and to keep the parallel with BiH, I will assume that the result would have been international intervention and a type of Dayton Agreement for South Africa.

Under such an agreement, the parties would have been kept more or less intact, i.e. they would have kept their constituencies defined largely along racial lines. Whites would probably have had to be offered a “homeland” and precarious arrangements would have had to be made regulating areas where the different races would interact. An international tribunal would most probably have replaced the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, with emphasis on justice rather than reconciliation.

The contract with big business on a developmental economic policy would probably not have been possible. It is doubtful that economic growth of the kind seen in South Africa post apartheid would have been possible under a BiH type dispensation. Violence would most probably have had to be ended not by agreement but by international intervention and supervision as in BiH.

South Africa’s integration in its region and in Africa would have been problematic and its capacity to play a role in reforms on the continent and increasingly in the wider context of world politics, such as in the G8, would not have played out as it has.

## 5. BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA WITH A TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION PROCESS: WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT?

After some time in Sarajevo I realized that I had heard several people talking about the time of Yugoslavia as one of relative prosperity, freedom and security. In Belgrade a historian pointed out that the period under Tito had been the longest period of uninterrupted peace in Belgrade's history for over a thousand years. It started me thinking what would have happened, had Tito lived long enough to experience the fall of the Berlin wall? I put it to some that maybe Yugoslavia had not disintegrated but rather prepared itself to join the EU as one, and as such a potentially quite powerful member of the community.

Instead, Yugoslavia disintegrated and a bloody and protracted conflict has now made it very difficult for the possibly last part of it, BiH, to join the EU. Given that the war has happened, would it have made any difference if BiH had after the war had a leader of Nelson Mandela's stature and inclination and if this leader had advocated a South African style reconciliation policy and process?

It would probably, given the context, have taken *three* Mandelas, one representing each of the major population groups. Now if they had existed, their message would of course have been strengthened by the mere fact that they agreed. A truth and reconciliation process would of course have had to be tailored to the specifics of the situation. I have no doubt that it would have been embraced by the international community, and I know for a fact that Sweden would have been happy to co-finance the process.

The process would probably have been more or less finished by the time I arrived in Sarajevo in 2000. Visits to newly dug up mass graves would then have been undertaken by joint groups and become part of healing rather than the opposite as has now been the case. The parties could easier have agreed to the EU agenda, for instance on reforming the army and police. I now remember vividly travelling with the diplomatic corps, invited by the Croat member of the Presidency, to visit some caves on the border with Croatia. We were wondering why the bus partly took small, rather dangerous roads along the mountain sides when we knew there was a parallel highway. The explanation was that we were heading with the Croatian leader to a place in the federation part of BiH, shared by Muslims and Croats, and could not pass through the other entity, Republika Srpska, which was on the way, because the police did not co-operate across the entity borders. When I said that I would take my own transport back, it was arranged to hand us over at the "border" on the way back!

An army with units which are divided along group lines, which is all that BiH has managed to agree to, is in my mind a recipe for disaster, should the population groups, as is quite possible, have another fall-out. Surely, integrated units would have been part of the political solution as in South Africa had the parties committed themselves to deal with the past.

Another consequence would have been massive savings on the part of the international community. One issue which seems to unite the parties in BiH is the view they have on what they see as massive outside interference in their affairs. Symptomatically, only the international military component is accepted as all realize the dangers of not having it.

So what could have been BiH's contribution to the region and to Europe? Well, it could have been an example of a nation coming out of a complex and difficult war and still managing to find the road back to peaceful co-existence. The Americans are said to have wooed the Muslim majority as it is seen as representing a risk if let alone and exposed to radical Muslim influence from outside. Worst case after 9-11 would for them have been a Muslim terrorist safe haven in the underbelly of Europe. The Bosnian Muslims themselves, as it is, see themselves as European Muslims and resent being told by Arab Muslims what to think or how to behave as Muslims in Europe. They see the Muslim communities in other European countries as run by amateurs, often a professional who may not have been active in his home country, now becoming a Muslim leader almost by default. With their five hundred plus years perspective as Muslims in Europe Bosnian Muslims advocate education and election of leadership grounded in a European context.

Croats and Serbs in BiH, it is often said, always have a home across the border, in Croatia and in Serbia. But it is interesting that they also feel at home in BiH and do not generally advocate "Anschluss". A reconciled BiH on a growth path and on its way to the EU could have been a place to be proud to come from, just as being a post-apartheid South African is.

During my interviews with Bosnian politicians and other leaders, I put it to them that what they are now busy doing is actually the opposite to Tutu's vision of what reconciliation is about: to build a shared future from a divided past. In BiH, the agenda seems to be to build a divided future from what was, at least under Tito, a shared past.

## 6. CONCLUSION

In this paper, an attempt has been made to use the author's experiences as a diplomat working in and with southern Africa and also in Bosnia Herzegovina to make a comparison between two post-conflict countries, South Africa and Bosnia Herzegovina. The comparison is built especially around the presence or absence of a truth and reconciliation process. An attempt is made to describe what could have happened had South Africa *not* had political leadership that encouraged reconciliation and what might have happened had Bosnia Herzegovina had such leadership and adopted a reconciliation policy.

The main result of the comparison, from the author's point of view, is what an alternative scenario could have meant for Bosnia Herzegovina. It is now a country where the citizens who left during the war do not want to return. Those who stayed are deeply suspicious of each other and all three main population groups see themselves as victims of the conflict. They vote "nationalistic" and their politicians block any reform which might infringe on the tenuous minority rights accruing out of a peace accord designed and pushed through in a very short time at a US airbase, Dayton. The only part of the international presence which they support is the military as it has kept them from going back to war.

The alternative could have looked a bit like South Africa: A (European) model of reconciliation after conflict, a multicultural society where a more than five hundred year old Muslim tradition lives side by side with the orthodox and catholic faiths of neighbouring countries, as was the case before the last war. A country its citizens would return to and be proud of.

Similarly, it can be argued that South Africa without a reconciliation policy could easily have slipped back into conflict, making economic growth impossible and perhaps making it necessary for the international community to intervene to keep peace.

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## LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

- HE Mr. Jan Braathu, Ambassador of Norway, Sarajevo
- HE Ms Maryse Beniau, Ambassador of France, Sarajevo
- Ms Riny Bus, Deputy Head of Mission/Head of Development Cooperation, Embassy of Netherlands, Sarajevo
- Mr. Per Byman, Sida
- Dr. Mustafa Ceric, Reis-ul-Ulema of the Islamic Community of BiH, Sarajevo
- Mr. Graham Day, Special Adviser to Mr M Dodik, Prime Minister Republika Srpska
- Ms. Vojka Djikic, poet and writer, Editor of Sarajevo Notebooks
- HE Mr. Charles L. English, Ambassador of the United States of America, Sarajevo
- HE Mr. Alessandro Fallavollita, Ambassador of Italy, Sarajevo
- HE Mr. Jacob Finci, Ambassador of BiH to Switzerland
- Mr. Mladen Ivanic, former Foreign Minister of BiH, Parliament, Sarajevo
- Mr. Igor Kalabukhov, Minister Counsellor of the Russian Embassy, Sarajevo
- Mr. Mirsad Kebo, Vice President of the Federation of BiH, Sarajevo
- Dr. Roland Kostic, Peace and Conflict Research Department, Uppsala University
- HE Mr. Dimitris Kourkalas, Ambassador, Head of Delegation of the European Commission, Sarajevo
- Mr. Gus Mackay, Head of DFID Office, British Embassy, Sarajevo
- Ms. Lejla Mamut, Regional Cooperation Manager, Research and Documentation Center, Sarajevo
- Mr. Thabo Mbeki, former President of South Africa
- Ms Sue van der Merwe, deputy foreign minister
- Ms. Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, former Deputy President
- Mr. Billy Modise, former Ambassador to Canada and Chief of Protocol, Presidency
- Mr. Nicolas Moll, Deputy Director, Centre André Malraux, Sarajevo
- Mr. Per Normark, Politico-Military Adviser to EUSR and EU Political Advisor to COM EUFOR, Sarajevo
- Mr Aziz Pahad, former deputy foreign minister
- Mr. Stefan Simosas, Head of OHR/EUSR Political Department, Sarajevo
- HE Mr. Osman Topcagic, Ambassador, Head of Mission of Bosnia Herzegovina to the EU, Brussels
- Ms. Lidija Topic, Advisor, Regional Cooperation Council, Brussels
- HE Mr. Bulent Tulun, Ambassador of Turkey, Sarajevo
- HE Mr. Imre Varga, Ambassador of Hungary, Sarajevo

## QUOTES FROM INTERVIEWS

- "mistrust and fear...getting stronger"
- "for Serbs, voting for nationalistic parties is not a matter of choice, but one of survival as a minority"
- "There is no middle ground"
- "Religious leaders are worse than the politicians"
- "The youth is if anything, more radical than their parents"
- "BiH is the victim of irresponsible European politics"
- "There is need for a new generation of leaders"
- "Today, stagnation is perhaps a best-case scenario"
- "If Tito had lived for ten more years, he could have held Yugoslavia together"
- "Dodik's talk of secession is a classical early warning signal"
- "Dodik knows that secession is not realistic"
- "The Federation is today better militarily prepared" and "stronger than the RS"
- "The (political) agendas of the 1990s are back"
- "The meeting in Prud was a first sign of an attempt at a homegrown agreement"
- "BiH recently scored the lowest on trust between population groups in an international comparison – 7%"
- "The EU integration process will solve many of the outstanding reform issues"
- "The International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia, ICTY, has not led to recognition of guilt on behalf of perpetrators and those who supported them"
- "It is good to keep some international military presence"
- "A Truth and Reconciliation Commission is still necessary to save BiH, if it can be saved"
- "More than half a million small arms are still thought to be held by civilians and the army is divided ethnically on the ground, a potential for trouble"
- "Two steps forward, followed by three backwards" (on the political development in BiH)
- "There is even speculation of a risk of a new war"
- "Risk for deterioration of the social situation when the economy declines"
- "The nationalist parties would win by an even larger margin if elections were held today"
- "Sports events lead to sectarian violence and media are divided"
- "Relations between the population groups have not improved. The tendency is negative."
- "Vissa politiska framsteg har gjorts. Det finns inga tecken på förberedelser för väpnad konflikt"
- "Some political progress has been made. There are no signs of preparations for armed conflict."
- "Practically no Bosnian exiles return (from Sweden)"